



Version of attached le:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Stopford, Richard (2020) 'Threshold concepts and certainty : a critical analysis of 'troublesomeness'.', Higher
education. .
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-020-00628-w
Publisher's copyright statement:
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain




The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom






Threshold concepts and certainty: a critical analysis 
of ‘troublesomeness’
Richard Stopford1 
Accepted: 14 September 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The threshold concept framework is a key contemporary theory in pedagogy. The core idea 
is that ‘threshold concepts’ are distinctively ‘troublesome’ for students and act as gatekeep-
ers to their disciplines. No doubt the theory is compelling because there is surely some-
thing right about this. Student difficulty with conceptual material is familiar to all teaching 
practitioners. Furthermore, to avoid rote levels of understanding, mastery of discipline-spe-
cific conceptual material is key. However, TCF has struggled to articulate key dimensions 
of its theory: it is without a methodology for identifying threshold concepts. It has also 
faltered in explaining how student difficulty is a function of difficulties endemic to the con-
cepts, rather than as a contingent phenomenon about individual students.
I offer a novel way to think about identifying threshold concepts, and for theorising student 
difficulties which may arise from those concepts. I argue that there is an ‘existential’ kind 
of certainty which acts as a framework within which epistemic activities take place. Disci-
plines which theorise concepts in ways that clash with students’ existential certainties are 
candidates for threshold concepts and may generate ‘objective’ difficulties for students. As 
much as I think theorising existential certainty helps TCF overcome theoretical challenges, 
it would require revisions to the way that it is currently being theorised and applied. I also 
believe that even without attachments to TCF, ‘existential certainty’ is a real phenomenon, 
shaping the very possibilities of student experience, and which any pedagogical theory 
should be aware of.
Keywords Threshold concepts · Wittgenstein · Certainty · Rowbottom · Epistemology · 
Gender theory
Preliminaries
In 2003, Land and Meyer posed an innovative way for thinking about concepts within 
disciplines and the troubles they pose in student learning. Whilst the threshold concept 
framework (TCF) is theoretically complex, the idea is straightforward and has potential 
import for any teaching practice. A significant source of student learning difficulty is 
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due to discipline-specific concepts that must be mastered in order for students to suc-
cessfully participate in the discipline. For example, if a student does not understand 
‘gravity’, how are they going to study physics given that gravity plays such an impor-
tant role in a great deal of physics’ theory and practice? ‘Gravity’ is preponderant 
throughout physics’ theories and practice; our conception of that phenomenon shapes 
and inflects the rest of the conceptual apparatus of physics’ theories. A student must do 
more than learn some discrete packet of information codified within a concept—no mat-
ter how important. A deep understanding of ‘gravity’ requires understand the complex 
ways that ‘gravity’ suffuses physics theories and practice. Until a student has this deeper 
understanding of this concept—amongst others of course—they will find themselves on 
the outside of the discipline looking in. By contrast, to have deep understanding of the 
concept is to step over the threshold/boundaries of the discipline into an insider posi-
tion, as it were.
If Land and Meyer are right about threshold concepts (TC) as crucial for deep learn-
ing, this has immediate general effects for practitioners in higher education, and teachers 
more generally. Firstly, these concepts must be identified by teachers as (conceptual/theo-
retical) gatekeepers of the discipline. As such, the TCF must be able to help practitioners 
to disentangle and accommodate for, special difficulties in students’ learning—after all, 
no one denies that students often find concepts hard to grasp. Finally, given the supposed 
scope of influence of TCs throughout disciplines, practitioners must be aware of the affec-
tive effects on the students: to not grasp a threshold concept is to implicate a student’s 
relationship to the discipline and all the frustrations and stress which attend that. In short, 
threshold concepts are a pedagogical framework for thinking about learning experience, 
coordinated around student difficulties and transformations which revolve around special 
kinds of concepts.
If the threshold concept framework (TCF) properly theorises learning structures and 
distinctions in student difficulty and is an apt model for coordinating teaching practice in 
the face of such difficulties, it demands our attention. And it does have our attention. This 
is unsurprising given that any teacher and pedagogue knows the irreducibility of student 
difficulty; student troubles are everyone’s problems. Since 2003, TCF has generated a huge 
amount of theoretical and empirical interest. Yet, TCF is under an unusual degree of theo-
retical pressure on three counts. Firstly, because it is a pedagogical framework coordinated 
about concepts, and it inherits all the problems of dealing with such difficult and divi-
sive entities. Moreover, TCF is committed to saying that it has identified, in effect, a new 
and important class of concepts which then needs theorising, establishing and justifying. 
Third, TCF does more than draw our attention to the idea that disciplines have challenging, 
bespoke concepts—an important yet somewhat uncontroversial point. Rather, TCF makes 
the stronger claim that what makes these concepts distinctive is that they are inherently dif-
ficult to learn. Indeed, TCF makes the strong claim that TCs just are troublesome to learn, 
and that this troublesomeness is indexed to the role and situation in the discipline. So, on 
the one hand, TCF offers us an entire framework for thinking through pedagogical theory 
and practice, but it can only do so on the basis that it makes good on these points of theory. 
If it cannot do so, it may be that, at best, it reminds us that concepts can often be tricky to 
understand. This is clearly important but hardly a pedagogical framework for theory and 
practice. I argue that, in its current form, it does no more than this. Nevertheless, I want to 
argue that with some significant revisions in how student difficulty is theorised, it can do 
much more: it can identify a distinctive class of concepts; these concepts will pose difficul-
ties for some students for more fundamental reasons than they are just tough to learn. This, 
I take it, is a form of TCF that does demand our attention. In so doing, I aim to make some 
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important distinctions about student difficulties in their learning experience which will be 
relevant even if the reader is not convinced by, or attached to, TCF.
Locating ‘certainty’ in threshold concepts
It is clear that TCF must establish its theoretical commitments before we can take it seri-
ously as model for practice. Why look for threshold concepts if we cannot establish that 
there are such concepts? Why think that student difficulty is something about the con-
cepts rather than something about individual student experience? Arguably, TCF has done 
poorly in addressing both theoretical challenges. What a TC is, what its essential features 
are, and how we identify them—if there even are such concepts—remains unresolved. 
Originally Meyer and Land (2003: 4—5; 2005) argued that TCs were ‘transformative’ of 
student experience, ‘liminal’ insofar as their acquisition involves a period of disturbance 
as a learner, ‘irreversible’ in that once understood they cannot be unlearned as it were, 
determining of disciplinary ‘boundaries’, and intrinsically ‘troublesome’ to learn. Land 
has since extended the criteria (2011). Furthermore, the criteria themselves have been con-
tested (Male and Baillie 2011; Foley (2011); . These contestations have been surveyed and 
explored by Quinlan et al. (2013: 586–7) and Barradell (2013: 266–9). It is not necessary, 
here, to adjudicate between these competing conceptions of the view: I will focus on one 
trajectory for developing TCF revolving around the characteristic ‘troublesomeness’ of cer-
tain concepts (Taylor 2006: 90—1; 2008: 186; Cartensen and Bernhard 2008: 144). That 
is not to suggest that the necessity and sufficiency of troublesomeness have been uncon-
tested (Hill, 2020: 673–5). Nevertheless, I think the following analysis goes some way to 
addressing Hill’s concerns and making a case for the value of troublesomeness as defining 
of TCs. How then do we think about ‘troublesomeness’ as the core of the theory? One way 
is through TCs’ affects: difficult concepts will have an impact on students’ emotional well-
being (see Rattray, 2016: 71–2; Timmermans and Meyer, 2019: 51—67). Not wanting to 
be too schematic by pulling apart the affective from the cognitive, but what of the cognitive 
dimension? In the literature, there is a move to thinking about the cognitive dimension of 
troublesomeness in terms of ‘uncertainty’ (Land, 2016: 11).
What, then, is ‘uncertainty’? The purpose of this paper is to explore the phenomenon of 
‘uncertainty’ and how it might help clarify the troublesome nature of threshold concepts: 
what they are, and how they are problematic for students. Land rightly highlights the way 
that uncertainty can be a good thing in student experience: it can be a form of openness 
and flexibility in student understanding. Nevertheless, this point does not help clarify the 
theoretical foundations of threshold concepts. Nor does it imply any special relationship 
between uncertainty and TCs. That said, I think that there is something promising about 
this idea, albeit with a shift of emphasis. It is not uncertainty, but ‘certainty’ that could 
really help finesse the theoretical foundations of TCF. I want to explore the idea that cer-
tainty is the better index of student ‘troublesomeness’ because it is when student certainties 
clash with discipline-specific conceptual content that some of the most profound difficul-
ties in students’ learning experience arise. Furthermore, this is not just any kind of cer-
tainty, but a distinctive, fundamental level of certainty that I will be referring to as ‘exis-
tential certainty’—inspired by the work of the philosopher, Wittgenstein. What I mean by 
this will become clearer through the course of the paper. For now, think of ‘existential’ as 
whatever pertains the meaningfulness of life as such. Existential certainties are the sureties 
out of which a meaningful life is constituted and which make possible a solid foundation 
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for particular kinds of meaningfulness—semantic, epistemic, normative. If TCF can analy-
ses ‘troublesomeness’ by way of ‘existential certainty’, and this is at the foundational level 
of student experience, we may have found a good way to theorise the theoretical founda-
tions of TCF, its special concepts, and the distinctive kinds of difficulty that attends those 
concepts.
Indeed, it is crucial that TCF is able to give a theory of its own concepts, and of the 
distinctiveness of the difficulty that attends those concepts because, as already mentioned, 
TCF has been strongly challenged on both of those counts. Rowbottom (2007: 268) argues 
that TCF does not have a working account of how to identify threshold concepts, or that 
the difficulty of those concepts resides in the concept itself, rather than in the particulari-
ties of student abilities and experience. These challenges have sometimes been noted but 
never fully tackled in subsequent literature (see Nicola-Richmond et  al., 2018). First, he 
has argued that TCF is unable to provide any clear theory for how we identify TCs (See 
also O’Donnell, 2010: 2). None of the characteristic features of TCs offered in primary 
literature—transformation, liminality, irreversibility and boundedness—are, by their own 
admission necessary or sufficient. As such we have very little solid ground for saying some 
concept, ‘gravity’ say, is a threshold concept of physics, but ‘heat’ is not. Assume ‘gravity’ 
has all the characteristics but ‘heat’ only one. Is ‘gravity’ a TC, but not ‘heat’? We cannot 
tell because the progenitors of the theory admit that sometimes a concept has all the char-
acteristics and sometimes not. It is just too loose a theory as it stands. TCF must provide 
some kind of in principle way to define and thereby provide identity conditions for thresh-
old concepts. Salwén has gone on to analyse a host of possible semantic responses to deal 
with the definitional problem, concluding that none are successful (2019: 2–8); I agree. In 
fact, TC theorists still need to convince us that there are such concepts! Current empirical 
work is dangerously close to being both a ‘shot in the dark’ and methodologically circular: 
given that the identity conditions of threshold concepts are deeply contested, how can we 
use the theory to confidently identify them? More to the point, we had better not be using 
an already too elastic theory to identify threshold concepts, then using those ‘threshold 
concepts’ as evidence for the theory. Indeed, I worry that this may be happening given the 
methodological outline in studies such as that of White et al. (2016: 55–6)—see also Sal-
wén, (2019: 9–12).
Rowbottom’s second argument is just as damaging. TCF claims that TCs are intrinsi-
cally difficult to acquire. However, as he argues with the ‘gravity’ example, anecdotal evi-
dence of student learning clearly shows that some students will find a concept difficult and 
some will not. Difficulty is not endemic to the concept. Concepts are not intrinsically dif-
ficult, rather they are difficult for a student given the student’s experience and capabilities. 
Student difficulty has to be treated as phenomenon about students, not about concepts as 
such (2007: 268). If he is right—and there is surely something right about the idea that 
difficulty is a function of individual student situations—this is a significant blow for TCF 
given its claims that TCs are (intrinsically) difficult. Indeed, it is only due to this supposed 
intrinsic difficulty that TCF theorises ‘threshold concepts’ as disciplinary phenomena. 
Land and Meyer try to coordinate this difficulty in their paper, 2005: 380; and, in Meyer 
et  al. (2008). However, I am sceptical of their success largely because they are working 
with an intrinsic—read: necessary—notion of conceptual difficulty on the one hand, and 
trying to square that with contingent student experience on the other. This modal clash—
between necessity and contingency—cannot be theorised away by clarifying structural 
stages in learning. It is not the contingency that Row bottom, or I, dispute, but that the 
putative necessity of conceptual difficulty is consistent with the actual contingencies of 
student experience. This does not make modal sense.
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Clearly the problems get somewhat abstract, and philosophical. However, this is the 
ground that TCF finds itself in given its claims. Moreover, these are not just abstract 
skirmishes in theory. To the extent that TCF contributes to a general understanding of 
student difficulty—which no one doubts is a real phenomenon—then failing to establish 
theoretical grounds for analysing and practically responding to student difficulties is a 
missed opportunity. I mobilise my analysis of certainty by way of these two problems 
precisely because TCF is under considerable theoretical pressure, and because the clari-
fication that ‘existential certainty’ could bring to TCF actually helps to dissolve both 
of these core issues. I think we can use the effects of students’ existential certainties in 
the classroom as a means for identifying TCs. This could solve Rowbottom’s first objec-
tion. More importantly perhaps, existential certainty will help ground student difficulty 
in something beyond the contingent situation of individuals. I will argue that existential 
certainties are effectively expressions of socio-cultural states of affairs. When I am exis-
tentially certain of something, we could say that I am expressing how the world is for 
me. Yet, such certainties are not so much my own acquired beliefs, as a foundational 
framework of intelligibility upon which I can build beliefs. So, existential certainties are 
articulations of fundamental attachments about how the world is; they are functions of 
enculturation, of being a member of a culture. As such, all of us take on various certain-
ties in a way that constitutes our being part of a culture and which we share with others 
who are also members of that culture. So, if certainties are not really products of indi-
viduals’ experiences but the cultural frameworks through which students make sense 
of themselves and the world around them, then we can locate a distinctive modality 
of student difficulty: I may express what seems like a personal difficulty, but when the 
source of that difficulty is a clash of disciplinary material with what I am certain of, the 
trouble is not merely subjective, but indicative of something at the socio-cultural level. 
In such cases we have a basis for thinking that some discipline specific conceptual mate-
rial will be ‘objectively’ troubling for some constituencies of students given their socio-
cultural background. Furthermore, such objective troublesomeness would be consistent 
with empirical evidence that the ‘troublesomeness’ of any candidate threshold concept 
is only experienced contingently by some students. Being able to clarify the identity 
conditions for threshold concepts, and being able to assert clear, ‘objective conditions’ 
for the ‘troublesomeness’ of some discipline specific material goes a long way to con-
solidating TCF as a robust theory of a distinctive class of concepts.
Nevertheless, my argument comes at a price for the theory. Such existential certain-
ties are readily identifiable, but that is because they occupy a distinctive role for epistemic 
agency: certainties constitute the framework which makes possible any epistemic activi-
ties such as learning, knowing, thinking, believing, reasoning, etc. As such, certainties are, 
properly speaking, prior to knowledge. This would be a problem for TCF as it currently 
stands because most examples of threshold concepts in the TCF literature, and the way that 
attendant student difficulties are characterised, are epistemic, i.e. pertaining to knowledge. 
I cannot hope to survey all examples of candidate concepts here, but see for example: ‘pro-
portional reasoning’ and ‘opportunity cost’ in economics (Lloyd, & Frith, 2013; Shana-
han, 2016 respectively), ‘representation’ in philosophy (Booth, 2006); ‘osmosis’ in biology 
(Taylor, 2006), etc. So, much that is taken in the literature as a candidate for a threshold 
concept because of problems of understanding, no matter how ‘deep’, would not count as 
certainty-involving in the relevant way. If I am right, then either TCF has to bite the bullet 
that certainties constitute TCs, but then TCs are not epistemic material in the way they have 
been currently theorised, or reject my view of ‘existential certainty’ and lose its advantages 
in identifying the TCs and grounding ‘objective troublesomeness’.
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The second cost of my analysis is that the difficulties associated with TCs by way of 
existential certainty are not intrinsic to TCs vis-a-vis their role in a discipline. Difficulty is, 
as Rowbottom points out, a relational state of affairs. But he sees this as a relation simply 
between the student and the discipline. Again, this would make all student difficulty con-
tingent on the predicaments of individual students. This is important in its own right, but 
a deviation away from the claims of TCF. Existential certainty allows us to think about the 
relation as a clash between socio-cultural forms of living on the one hand which constitute 
the epistemic frameworks within which particular students operate, and discipline-specific 
material on the other. The problem is that, whilst this means that disciplinary boundaries 
may help to coordinate us towards ‘troublesome’ material, student difficulties indexed to 
existential certainties are not simply functions of disciplinary features, i.e. of concepts 
and the difficulty that inheres in them due to their role in a discipline. So, we cannot look 
inwards to disciplines to theorise TCs; rather, we must look at the complex mediations of 
individual student experience, socio-cultural background, alongside disciplinary content. I 
say this is a cost, but only to the theory as it currently stands. I would argue that my analy-
sis simply focuses our attention on the socio-cultural context within which disciplines are 
situated, rather than simply at disciplines, and that is as it should be.
Land has already made the link between threshold theories and uncertainty. This is a 
good place to begin: tracing some existing links in the literature. He thinks about the way 
that uncertainty is endemic to learning. The fact that TCF’s account of troublesomeness 
acknowledges and finds a pedagogical place for uncertainty is a virtue of the theory. This 
is fine as far as it goes. However, he does not provide an analysis of uncertainty, nor could 
his use of the notion meet the concerns raised above. This is not a problem given he is not 
trying to address these issues. Nevertheless, I will consider some possible ways that we 
could think about certainty to do just that, and then explicating what is so distinctive about 
this view. I will then characterise the relevant modality of certainty as existential, argu-
ing that it can be deployed to meet the challenges for TCF raised above. But also, how it 
would require us to think differently about TCF if it is adopted. I will finish by considering 
an example from my own teaching in philosophy, demonstrating a situation of ‘objective 
troublesomeness’.
Preparing students to be uncertain in an uncertain world: 
disentangling ‘epistemic confidence’ from ‘certainty’
I want to consider Land’s engagement with the notion of ‘certainty’. In his paper Toil 
and Trouble: Threshold Concepts as a Pedagogy of Uncertainty (2016), Land argues that 
‘uncertainty’ is both irreducible in a progressive educational experience (2016: 16 and 20), 
and that it provides a bulwark against the commodification of education that requires a 
kind of commodified ‘certainty’ (2016: 17). For the purposes of this paper, I want to set 
aside the political point—no matter how sympathetic I am—and focus on the epistemic 
dimensions of the argument. In a little more detail, I take it that he is arguing for two points 
(1 and 2) that have epistemic import, and a normative point (3) about the value of TCF 
given these epistemic points (2016: 21).
1 The world is a complex and dynamic place. We cannot future-proof disciplines with 
fixed ontological material when novel states of affairs are constantly emerging. Good 
theorising must be able to be responsive to future changes, and some appropriate need 
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for ontological pluralism. (2016: 16 - 7) Moreover—a point emphasised by way of Shul-
man—the complexity of the ‘real world’ is such that the theories we teach students do 
not perfectly, and without controversy, explain/predict/analyse the world we are teaching 
them to understand. To put it another way, theories are underdetermined in their real-
world applications, answers and solutions. As such, peddling an educational ‘product’ 
that is reified to the point of ‘certainty’ will thereby falsify the very phenomena which 
theories seek to grip (Land, 2016: 11, quoting Shulman, 2005: 1).
2 A corollary point of (1) is that being ‘certain’ as a student is to have a fixed way of think-
ing that is inappropriate for understanding and explaining dynamic, complex real-world 
phenomena (2016: 20 - 2).
3 TCF theorises ‘troublesomeness’ and ‘transformation’ as endemic to both learning and 
teaching, and is therefore appropriate to coordinating the uncertainties engendered in 1 
& 2 (2016: 18 - 20)—of course Land, quite reasonably, wants to make a further value 
claim for TCF given the political points I have sidelined here.
I am sympathetic to all these points. Focusing on (1) and (2) for now, the idea that 
theories cannot provide students with complete certainty—and should not hope to—is 
surely right. The question is, ‘right’ how? To motivate his paper, Land points to Shul-
man’s Pedagogy of Uncertainty (2005) and the latter’s reflections on medical pedagogy. 
Understanding Shulman’s view of ‘uncertainty’ might help us to analyse the uncertainty 
involved in (1) and (2). Shulman’s point, as I understand it, is that when medical prac-
titioners apply their medical training in real-world scenarios there is always the pos-
sibility that they could get it wrong. The real world (of disease and pathology) is so 
complex that it is usually the case that some symptom/pathology is consistent with a 
different diagnosis/treatment. Medical practitioners have to make important judgments 
on the basis of theory, and learnt practice, given that both tend to underdetermine the 
case at hand. Still, despite this underdetermination, they must be able to tell the differ-
ence between a good judgement and a bad judgement. And they have to live with the 
consequences (Shulman, 2005: 19—20).
Land and Shulman both think about such situations, quite reasonably, in terms of 
‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’. They do not analyse these terms; however, I think they 
have something like the following in mind. The doctor diagnoses her patient as best she 
can, given appropriate understanding of theory and acquired evidence. The patient asks 
her, ‘Is she certain that he has Lupus?’ She responds, ‘No. But it is my medical opin-
ion that it is’. One thing that medical students need to be taught is what constitutes a 
good medical opinion—presumably some complex admixture of theory, practice, intui-
tion, along with sound, relevant, common sense. Medical students must also be taught 
how to live with this ‘uncertainty’. For medical practitioners, some degree of ‘certainty’ 
is appropriate, but hubris is not. Nevertheless, decisions must be made whilst being 
‘uncertain’ because rampant ‘uncertainty’ may be as dangerous as hubris.
If I have teased out the relevance of ‘uncertainty’ correctly in this example, what 
seems to be happening here is that medical students have to assess their judgements. 
The doctor judges that the patient has x. But the doctor must also assess that judge-
ment itself alongside other possibilities, contingencies, risk management, etc. In other 
words, there is a ‘first-order’ epistemic act: the diagnosis, p, that ‘x has y’. And there 
is a ‘second-order’ epistemic act which is the evaluation of that first-order judgement: 
I judge that ‘p’ (‘p’ being the diagnosis) is a good judgement. The two orders are dis-
tinguishable insofar as they are based on different categories of material. The first-order 
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judgement is directly concerned with empirical states of affairs, e.g. symptoms. The 
second-order judgement is concerned with the practice and theory choice involved in 
the diagnostic management of the empirical evidence. We might express the second-
order judgement in terms of a propositional attitude: I am confident (propositional atti-
tude indicating second-order judgement) that x has y (first-order judgement). In this 
scenario the concept of uncertainty seems to be a way of talking about the tolerability 
of epistemic confidence in the first order judgement. The doctor might not be certain, 
but complete certainty is the wrong bar of epistemic confidence given her knowledge, 
understanding, evidence, and given the nature of diagnosis. A crucial part of her educa-
tion is learning what the appropriate degree of epistemic confidence in her diagnosis 
ought to be.
What has this to do with theorising TCF? In the details, not very much. Land does 
not say how it is that he was inspired by Shulman, and what about the medical situa-
tion explored in that paper is directly relevant to theorising TCF. He gestures towards a 
broad lesson, however: it’s okay to be uncertain. To that extent, TCF converges with the 
example. TCF students come across difficult conceptual material, and experience some 
form of epistemic uncertainty. In the case of the medical student we can see that this 
is simply an appropriate part of the practice. As Shulman also suggests, this could be 
part of a general lesson for students (2005: 22): it’s okay to find yourselves ‘uncertain’. 
Indeed, some degree of uncertainty can be an index of good practice and understanding!
However, I think we need to be aware of some slippage here. The TCF claim con-
cerns understanding and assimilation of discipline-specific conceptual material. In the 
medical student case, it may be that they have understood the concepts and practices 
of medical theory very well, and had no difficulty assimilating that material. This is 
because the issue of ‘uncertainty’ being explored above is a second-order issue of con-
fidence in their use and application of some medical theory, not a first-order uncer-
tainty expressing the status of their understanding of the theory/concept as such. So, we 
need to be careful taking ‘uncertainty’ in one epistemic register as a guide for theoris-
ing about uncertainty in another register. More to the point, presumably someone could 
still see the role of second-order uncertainty, without any commitment to uncertainty/
troublesomeness being endemic to discipline-specific conceptual material. In other 
words, we do not need TCF and there might be other more useful pedagogical theories 
for thinking through the example. Indeed, complexity theory as a modality of activ-
ity theory may be such an alternative. See Bleakley and Cleland’s (2015) analysis of 
medical practice involving non-linear problems and ‘emergent properties’ of complexity 
(83—85) as a way to explain the difficulties arising for the medical student.
Again, this is not the place to adjudicate theory choice. The point is not much follows 
about TCF from the example. To the extent that this example is a generalisable lesson 
about teaching and learning, it might sway us towards TCF because this pedagogy is 
already concerned with student difficulty. Yet, for the reasons just suggested, it is not 
a strong connection. Whatever association TCF has with second-order uncertainty, it 
does not seem to help us with either of the problems raised in part one: identifying TCs, 
and establishing an objective ground for student difficulty. The uncertainty the medical 
student experiences does not pertain to her entry into the discipline but the complexity 
of her practice having fully entered it. Furthermore, the generality of the difficulties of 
‘uncertainty’ do not pertain to the assimilation and understanding of particular concepts 
and practice. Rather, how general theories and practice underdetermine the particular 
complexities of real world cases; the medical example is an issue of application and 
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practice. In short, if this is all we had to say about ‘uncertainty’, I do not think it can do 
much work either theorising TCF, nor even as a normative reason for adopting TCF.
The example is useful, however, for generating some theoretical distinctions in the epis-
temic status of ‘uncertainty’. Second-order epistemic uncertainty—articulated in terms of 
confidence as explored in the medical example above—is not the only way to think about 
the term. I now want to extend the notion of uncertainty in its existential reach. Note that 
nothing in this additional account of uncertainty undermines the discussion above. What it 
does do, however, is allow us to think about ‘uncertainty’ as a fundamental difficulty expe-
rienced when students encounter disciplinary conceptual content that clashes with their 
pre-theoretical ‘certainties’. Indeed, it may be better to think of the clashes in disciplinary 
material with student certainty as an existential disturbance rather than mere uncertainty.
Existential certainty: epistemic frameworks and forms of living
In the above example, it is not that the medical student is uncertain what a ‘diagnosis’ is, 
means, or even what the practice of ‘diagnosis’ is, but whether or not some diagnosis is 
the right/best/most appropriate diagnosis; it is a second-order difficulty about practice. In 
this example, ‘certain’ signifies very confident; ‘uncertain’ is not very confident. Perhaps 
one thinks that this must be the only way to think about these notions. After all, if we 
are sincere in our use of the term, how often are we ever completely certain? Surely we 
could always be wrong. In this way, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘certainty’ are germane for judg-
ing incremental levels of doubtfulness: measurements of degrees of epistemic confidence, 
tracking cognitive and affective jeopardies in our knowledge-making practices. In this 
light, ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ exist on a spectrum, delimiting the bounds of epistemic 
confidence/doubt respectively. Moreover, in such contexts, ‘uncertainty’ may be a good 
thing, as it were. I am happy to concede that this is one way we use the two concepts. But 
against the idea that this is the only way, I want to think through a notion of Wittgenstein-
ian uncertainty.
Before proceeding, some preliminaries about the argument and Wittgenstein’s role in 
the argument are appropriate. The account of certainty and uncertainty developed below 
is inspired by Wittgenstein. To help readers unfamiliar with his philosophy, I will provide 
quotations to give some idea of the source. However, a couple of things to note: Wittgen-
stein’s aphoristic style is notoriously gnomic and open to interpretation. As such, Wittgen-
stein scholarship is often divided. Nothing in the argument of this paper rests on a scholarly 
fidelity to Wittgenstein. The ideas here are inspired by what I take to be his view. Neverthe-
less, whether I am right or wrong about Wittgenstein, I hope my account of ‘existential cer-
tainty’ resonates with the reader’s own experience, and seems plausible on its own terms. 
The argumentative issue here is not about Wittgenstein and whether or not he is right, or 
that I am right about him, but whether or not the account of existential certainty offered 
here resonates, and helps us to understand the complexities of student difficulty as we find 
them in the classroom.
Wittgenstein argues that there is a much more fundamental way of thinking about ‘cer-
tainty’ at least: in this fundamental register, certainties are articulations of forms of liv-
ing which make possible knowledge-making practices (1972: §§94—5). I want to call this 
kind of certainty ‘existential’, as opposed to ‘epistemic’ for reasons which will become 
clear. This kind of fundamental certainty does not come in degrees, and it does not track 
confidence in what we know. It also does not exist on a spectrum alongside degrees of 
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uncertainty. When one is certain in this way, the thought of being able to be uncertain is 
unintelligible or absurd. Such certainty is the condition for the possibility of any kind of 
knowing. With this view of ‘certainty’ we are all certain of many things, and all of the 
time. I will now explore this view, distinctions about knowledge-making practices that 
might arise from it, and how this view of certainty enables us to meet the theoretical chal-
lenges to TCF laid out in part one.
Imagine I claim the following: ‘It is raining outside’. And someone asks me: ‘Are you 
certain?’ I might respond that I am. Only 5 min ago, I looked out of the window and it was 
raining heavily. The rain was beating on the roof, and it is still doing so. Even though I am 
not now looking out of the window, I still (strongly) believe it to be raining. But the person 
I am speaking to tells me I am wrong regardless. I look out the window, exasperated, and 
to my surprise it is now sunny and the ‘rain sound’ I can hear is run-off water from a gut-
ter. I’m wrong. When I said I was ‘certain’, I was expressing a high degree of confidence 
in my knowledge. As a result of my ‘certainty’ I was even a touch irritated when someone 
checked. But it turns out I am wrong; I understand why, and I am prepared to accept that 
I am wrong. Contrast this very mundane situation with the following. Someone asks me 
my name; I tell them. But then they want to see some ID. In some scenarios this request 
is perfectly intelligible: I am trying to board a plane, for example. But imagine that this is 
nothing to do with my telling the truth, rather they want to check whether or not I know my 
name—Wittgenstein explores such examples (§82). This considerably cuts down scenarios 
in which this request for justification makes sense. Perhaps I have hit my head and the 
person is a policewoman wanting to check if I’m compos mentis. Now imagine it is just an 
everyday situation and someone simply wants to know if I know my name—as if I could be 
mistaken in the same way as I was in the raining example. In such a scenario, I would not 
give them my ID, or reasons, or evidence. I would tell them that of course I know what my 
name is, and by telling them my name, I am telling them what is the case, i.e. of how things 
are beyond the possibility of discussion.
This is not a situation in which I’m prepared to admit of investigation, questioning, 
incredulity, or any other standard epistemic attitudes or practices. This is because it does 
not even make sense to me that I might be wrong; I am certain. Indeed, that certainty is so 
strong, and of a kind, that I am baffled by my interlocutor: that they seem to take it as a live 
possibility that I might be wrong. This idea that there are times when we are communicat-
ing beyond the bounds of standard epistemic practices, e.g. justification, is captured by 
Wittgenstein in the following, somewhat gnomic aphorisms: To be sure there is justifica-
tion; but justification comes to an end (§192). ‘It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, 
better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back’ (§471). In 
other words, there are cases in which we have arrived a kind of foundation in which we 
claim that something simply ‘is the case’ and there is nothing more to be said: ‘Instead of 
“I know it”, one may say in some cases “That’s how it is—I rely upon it”’ (§176).
What we have in the name example is a very important idea for theorising a fundamen-
tal distinction in the structure of epistemology as such, no matter how seemingly trivial 
the scenario. This situation reveals to us that there are some claims that might appear to 
be standard, first-order, empirical knowledge claims (‘My name is “x”’), and so subject to 
standard epistemic activities such as the giving and taking of reasons, yet are nothing of 
the sort. Whereas standard ‘knowledge’ claims admit of doubt, investigation, justification, 
and evaluation, a genuine certainty precludes such activities; it is not a context where such 
activities make sense. Indeed, Wittgenstein argues that epistemic activities such as doubt-
ing only operate successfully when there is some material that is held fixed. For example, 
how can you doubt if your doubt is so global that it implicates the language that expresses 
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the doubt: ‘If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. 
The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (§155). It seems such certainties are not 
knowledge claims at all precisely because they are not acquired, contestable, and subject to 
inquiry in the way that knowledge essentially is: ‘But I did not get my picture of the world 
by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correct-
ness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false’ 
(§94). In response to some kind of epistemic incredulity about my name, I am likely to 
question the intelligibility of our conversation: ‘What do you mean, “Are you certain your 
name is “x”?” Of course I am certain!’ In short, I do not counter with evidence, reasons, 
or arguments; I counter by questioning the conditions of intelligibility of the conversation 
itself. We are not contesting some knowledge, we are already in some disagreement about 
what counts as appropriate material for conducting epistemic activity.
My entitlement to my name, as something more fundamental than knowledge, is some-
thing to do with my very socialisation. That the socio-cultural world is intelligible to me, 
and that I am intelligible to myself within that socio-cultural space is in part expressed by 
the naming practices which contribute to situating that entitlement. In such cases I can say 
that I am indeed completely ‘certain’. How the world is for me, and how-I-am-in-the-world 
is such that I am entitled to claim with certainty that my name is ‘x’. Moreover, this is not 
just something about my comportment in the world, but how I am with others: it is a socio-
cultural state of affairs. ‘Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin 
to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life” (§358). What is certain for me are those 
shared social practices that congeal as cultures—or ‘forms of life’—and which enable me 
to make sense of myself with others. It is in light of the fundamentality of the certainty 
involved that I call this certainty ‘existential’ rather than ‘epistemic’. Existential certainties 
are a condition of my being able to make sense of myself and the world around me; they 
underwrite meaningfulness as such. As a consequence, uncertainty is not really available 
in such cases; existential ‘certainty’ is exhaustive and does not exist on a spectrum with 
‘uncertainty’ (§§114—5).
What this discussion does is bifurcate epistemology, and our epistemic practices, into 
actual knowledge, and the conditions for the possibility of that epistemic agency. The 
effects of this for education in general, not just TCF, are significant. On the basis of what 
has been said so far, we can schematise the analysis of ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ and its 
relationship to knowledge in the following ways:
Epistemic
1 ‘Certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ as complementary synonyms for ‘knowing’ and ‘not know-
ing’, respectively: I am uncertain that ‘x’ may be substituted for I do not know that ‘x’;
2 ‘Certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ as complementary second-order epistemic attitudes: I am 
not certain that I know ‘x’, but I take it that I do know that ‘x’;
3 ‘Certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ as complementary phenomenological states involved in 
one’s ‘knowledge’ of ‘x’. I am not certain that I know ‘x’ is to reflect on what ‘knowing’ 
is like in some instance;
Existential
4 ‘Certainty’ as a fundamental expression of ‘how things are’ for the subject: I am certain 
that ‘x’ is equivalent to whatever else, regardless, ‘x’ just is the case.
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• Existential certainty normally precludes the notion of uncertainty, and grounds the pos-
sibility of epistemic certainty and uncertainty. To become existentially uncertain/dis-
turbed is not merely to lack confidence in some putative knowledge, it is for the struc-
ture of knowing and believing to begin falling apart. Rarely do we become uncertain in 
this way.
Point (1) is simply an allowable synonymity given connotational suppleness of the terms 
‘certain’ and ‘known’. I do not take this to be interesting in this context. Points (2) and (3) 
basically come together to form the epistemic confidence I have discussed in the ‘Preparing 
students to be uncertain in an uncertain world: disentangling ‘epistemic confidence’ from 
‘certainty’’ section. By contrast, existential certainties—analysed as (4) of the above sche-
mata—are expressions of those ways all cultures stabilise themselves as socio-historical 
forms of living, into which we are socialised as epistemic agents. Certainties constitute the 
unquestioned, stable framework against which we make sense of ourselves and the world 
around us. To be uncertain in this context is existentially devastating. As Wittgenstein puts 
it: ‘when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible…’ (§194). The 
objectivity that he links to certainty is crucial because it indicates that the foundations of 
the certainty do not lie in the (knowing) subject, but in the socio-cultural milieu in which 
subjects make sense of themselves as subjects. Another way of putting this point is that we 
cannot question everything that we ‘know’ all at once. We have to hold some ‘knowledge’(/
certainties) as a fixed ground upon which knowledge may be built. What we hold fixed in 
this way is not a result of personal choice—after all choice is in some relevant sense an 
epistemic activity—even if it seems as such. What we hold fixed as certain, are functions 
of large-scale socio-cultural forms of living which provide frameworks for the intelligibil-
ity of our social activities—including epistemic practices such as teaching and learning 
(§410).
We can see here that the problematics of certainty explored here have resonances with 
issues highlighted by pedagogical theories of ‘conceptual change’ (CC). It is worth spend-
ing a moment on these resonances to emphasise the distinctiveness of the claim about exis-
tential certainty. CC arose from the likes of Kuhn’s historical analysis of scientific prac-
tice. He argues that clashes of incommensurability between differing conceptual schemata 
present challenges for scientists that implicate entire paradigms within which they operate 
(Kuhn, 1962: 37). This theory has then inspired pedagogical analysis into student difficulty 
more generally: students experience learning difficulty when their pre-existing, conceptual 
understandings (‘misconceptions’) clash with theories of concepts as they are being taught 
(see Nussbaum and Novick 1982: 184; Posner et al. (1982) 212–3). It is hard for a student 
to learn some idea if an implication of what they already understand by a concept is at odds 
with, or cannot accommodate for, what is being taught. Furthermore, CC theorists have 
argued for augmenting the ‘cold’, somewhat cognitivist rendering of conceptual content 
and assimilation, with ‘warm’ parameters which involve student motivations and socio-cul-
tural factors (see Strike and Posner (1992) 163; Pintrich, Marx and Boyle (1993) 182–5). 
What I say here clearly complements such theorising and has implications for it. How-
ever, CC is still first and foremost about epistemic clashes between conceptual schemata. 
Again, what is distinctive in my analysis is the consideration of existential dispositions that 
frame the epistemic domain. Warm CC, which considers socio-cultural factors that account 
for the acquisition and assimilation of conceptual schemata, still operates with a notion 
of concepts at the epistemic level. This is fine, and nothing I say is meant to undermine 
that analysis within the epistemic domain. Nevertheless, an existential certainty is a com-
mitment that frames the intelligibility of such clashes. In other words, troubles that arise 
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as a result of student certainties are not problems of misconception; breaking down those 
misconceptions through standard epistemic practices—such as demonstrating the failure in 
explanatory power of mistaken theories in the face of empirical evidence—are not apt for 
dealing with difficulties that arise out of existential certainties. Another way of putting the 
problem that teachers face in cases of existential certainty is that the material being taught 
will strike the student as unreasonable, and not merely false. In such a case why would we 
think that standard reasoning/epistemic practices could overcome the learning obstacle?
All that said, it may be thought, given the name example, that what count as certainties 
must be mundane or trivial. That is not the case. Certainties may be expressions of sur-
prising richness and depth precisely because certainties are piecemeal articulations of the 
forms of living that congeal as cultures. Moreover, given that any culture has its certainties, 
as it were, it does not follow that the issues being explored here are particular to any cul-
ture. So, just because the European Enlightenment traditions that shape the cultural imagi-
nary of ‘Western’ epistemology, which has historically tended to foreground the epistemic 
value of uncertainty/rational doubt, it does not follow that ‘Western’ cultures are ‘above’ 
having existential certainties. Nor is there anything in this view of existential certainty that 
privileges any particular cultural content: secular, scientific cultural forms of living have 
their certainties as much as any other. There is therefore, a strong degree of cultural relativ-
ism built into this theory. Nevertheless, even if that is a worry for the reader, the aim here 
is not to justify or argue for the view of certainty at hand, even though I would defend it. 
The point is to explore its explanatory power for TCF—justification of attendant commit-
ments would have to be wrestled with after. Regardless, we find out how important, rich, 
and complex existential certainties are when we try to teach material which puts pressure 
on such foundations. I now want to consider such a scenario. This helps us to understand 
what might be happening with certainties, to elaborate the difficulties that arise for students 
and teachers alike, and how we might think of such certainty-involving conceptual mate-
rial as candidates for a threshold concept. This example also demonstrates how a candidate 
threshold concept may turn out to be implicated in a socio-cultural certainty. As such, it is 
both relatively easy to identify by the distinctive existential trouble it causes for students, 
and to show that the troublesomeness engendered is far deeper than an individual’s epis-
temic difficulty.
When what we teach is ‘certainly false’: the epistemic limits 
and conditions for the possibility of teaching and learning
I teach many areas of philosophy, from technical, analytic philosophy to poststructural-
ist gender theory. It is only in the latter domain that I have come across student difficulty 
that seems relevant to the kind of certainty discussed in the ‘Existential certainty: epis-
temic frameworks and forms of living’ section. When teaching Judith Butler’s critique of 
the concepts ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, some students find the material distinctively troublesome. 
Indeed, student difficulty has often expressed itself in profoundly hostile and vehement 
forms: Butler’s theory of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ is ‘clearly false’, ‘nonsense’, ‘stupid’, ‘unin-
telligible’. These kinds of responses appear to be in the vein of (4a) and (4b) above. It 
concerns a clash between discipline specific conceptual material and what students take to 
be certain; the phenomenological character of this difficulty is profound existential threat. 
In the case of Butler’s theory of gender, we find a concept that ticks all the criteria of a 
threshold concept, is genuinely distinctive in its difficulty, and which can be theorised at as 
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a function of socio-cultural states of affairs as opposed to merely ‘subjective’ difficulty. As 
such, poststructuralist analyses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ might render them exemplar threshold 
concepts given the analysis so far.
Firstly, we should note that Butler’s analysis is a debate-setting position: any student 
engaging with poststructuralist analyses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ needs to understand her 
theory—and by that I do not suggest that they must agree with her. How then does this 
result in distinctive student difficulty? To answer this, some of her claims are useful. In her 
book Gender Trouble, Butler argues that the pre-theoretical/hegemonic/conservative view 
that ‘sex’ is metaphysically prior to ‘gender’, and determines gender, does not stand up 
to scrutiny—see Butler (2005: 10—22) for details of the argument. Moreover, the notion 
that there is some objective, biological state of affairs that stands apart from the normative 
entanglements of ‘gender’ is misguided. Finally, that our thinking about ‘sex’ is in fact 
coordinated by our thinking about ‘gender’, and not the other way around. No-one doubts, 
least of all Butler, that these are controversial claims that fundamentally challenge the ways 
that western cultures standardly think about ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Moreover, her view thereby 
challenges how many people understand their own subjectivity, identity, the social struc-
tures implicated in ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ (which are arguably all structures), and how science 
fits into the world.
What do students make of this idea about sex and gender? Unsurprisingly some like 
and are prepared to take it up, others wish to reject it. It is the latter group I am interested 
in. Students who reject Butler’s position then fall into two camps: those who take the view 
to be appropriate for consideration, even if wrong in some way or other; and those who 
find the view literally nonsense. And it is this latter response that I think is crucial. In such 
cases, they are not saying that Butler is claiming something false; she is claiming some-
thing that it is unclaimable. In short, there are students for whom Butler is wrong, and there 
are students for whom Butler is certainly wrong. The way that I want to understand this is 
in terms of the epistemic analysis introduced in the ‘Existential certainty: epistemic frame-
works and forms of living’ section. For some people, when Butler claims that ‘sex’ is a 
socio-cultural, historical concept, she may as well be saying she has eighteen heads! What 
is the situation where such a claim could even make sense let alone be right or wrong? It 
is one thing to say something that may be false, it is another to make a sentence that has 
only the semblance of meaning, i.e. syntactically well-formed, semantically sensical at the 
atomistic level, and yet when considered as a meaningful sentence becomes unintelligible.
One may think that students’ epistemic responses of bafflement/hostility can be 
explained very simply: Butler is really wrong. Perhaps I should chalk up my teaching expe-
riences to nothing more than teaching something daft; there are many voices who would 
think that the problem here is nothing to do with conceptual troublesomeness, but a theory 
that ought not to be taught at all. Here is not the place to argue for or against Butler’s 
view, nor to justify her place on the curriculum. Regardless, student response to Butler 
as saying something certainly false is pedagogically important: it is a distinctive form of 
difficulty insofar that it is a use of a concept they cannot understand. Let us assume the 
problem is because Butler’s view is just ‘really out there’! But then there are other things 
on our philosophy curriculum that are considered mainstream, but which are far more ‘out 
there’ in particular respects. I also teach modal metaphysics which concerns the nature of 
‘possibility’—a core area in contemporary analytic philosophy. A significant view in this 
theory is that there are a countless infinity of alternate universes which really, concretely 
exist, that are knowable by thought alone, and which can help us make sense of a whole 
range of philosophically significant phenomena—see Lewis (1986: 133). It is a challeng-
ing position about possibility. But student difficulty, to use a modal notion, is not necessary 
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to learning the concept. Indeed, some students’ intellectual dispositions are such that they 
find it somewhat straightforward and compelling. Put another way, students may passion-
ately argue about the nature of possibility and whether or not we should think about possi-
bility in terms of ‘possible worlds’, but no student that I have ever met has found the theory 
of possible worlds beyond intelligibility. Yet, for Butler, the attempt to argue that ‘sex’ 
might be a function of ‘gender’ is, for some students, existentially repulsive.
I discuss these two examples, and their political import for teaching, in more detail else-
where (Stopford, forthcoming). All that said, if we use the resources of part three, there 
is no mystery here. The claim ‘sex is a natural phenomenon’ is itself a socio-cultural and 
historical certainty—note that there are no scare quotes inside this proposition precisely 
because the concepts involved are not understood to be available for interpretation. Many 
students have been inaugurated into a socio-cultural and historical milieu that takes some 
assumed form of scientistic naturalism to be the grounds and possibility of epistemic intel-
ligibility, especially on such matters as ‘sex’. Furthermore, the socio-historical ways that 
cultures are organised as intelligible, coherent, communicative spaces within which stu-
dents coordinate, and understand themselves, as epistemic agents, congeal as a fact-like 
framework within which epistemic activity can take place, and which leaves the frame-
work of ‘facts’ beyond the scope of epistemic inquiry. Whatever ‘sex’ is, it is codified into 
the economic, political, and social structures that certain cultures consist in. Hence, some 
students are certain that Butler is wrong. It is worth noting, and it is implied in the above 
analysis, that difficulties arising from clashes between student certainties and discipline 
specific material will be more acute or preponderant in certain disciplines relative to stu-
dent background. Again, this does not mean that some discipline will have intrinsically 
challenging material, but that difficulties could be anticipated with appropriate sensitivity 
to disciplinary content relative to constituencies of students.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to highlight a distinctive way that we are ‘certain’. The most com-
mon way that the term gets used, I suggest, is to express a level of confidence in what we 
know. However, there is a more fundamental way that we are certain, which rarely gets 
expressed, precisely because it is fundamental. Such certainty requires excavation from its 
position as the bedrock of knowledge. It has not been the role of this paper to provide jus-
tification for such certainty either by formal epistemology nor Wittgenstein scholarship. It 
has been to introduce the idea and motivate it as we might find it in our teaching practices. 
Hopefully, the reader will find the idea prima facie plausible and that it will resonate with 
them. Moreover, to the extent that I might be right, such certainty is going to be crucial 
for us to negotiate in any kind of teaching practice, because we, and our students, all have 
existential commitments which we take to be certain. At the very least, if what we teach 
clashes with such certainties, student resistance will be much more profound than epis-
temic difficulty.
This view of certainty could have explicit usefulness for TCF. TCF is currently under 
theoretical pressure to provide a method for identifying TCs, and for convincing us that 
TCs are difficult in ways other than personal difficulty. Existential certainty could help TCF 
on both fronts. TCs would be that conceptual material which clashes with student certainty 
and so we could identify a TC by a student’s reaction to it. Moreover, that reaction is not 
just a function of their own epistemic difficulty; it is due to their socio-cultural background 
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which precludes the intelligibility of the TC. As I have suggested, adopting my account 
of certainty for explanatory power would require some changes to TCF. TCs are likely to 
be less preponderant than has been theorised hitherto. Secondly, they are not the difficult 
material of the discipline, they are difficult in a relational sense: as a clash between the 
socio-cultural background of the student and the concept as rendered in the discipline. I 
have not argued that TCF ought to adopt my view. However, if they want to reject my view 
of certainty and its explanatory benefits, TCF is back to the drawing board with no in prin-
ciple way to establish that there even are TCs, let alone how to identify them, and a view 
of student difficulty that is no more than an important reminder that we have to attend to 
student difficulty—but no real method for how to deal with that difficulty.
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